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practice and one best securing all parties, that the obligation of
such bonds be expressly limited to one year, and that upon the
giving of a new bond by an officer re-elected, an examination
be made sufficient to test his integrity at that time.
A decree will be entered dissolving the injunction so far as
to allow the bank to collect the amount of the defalcations
proved, with interest.
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

Where a debtor settles the amount due from him to his creditors
upon notes and drafts, by giving him, in full satisfaction of the
claim, a draft on a third person for 50 per cent. of the amount payable in gold, which is subsequently paid, and the creditor accepts
such draft and surrenders and cancels the evidences of the indebtedness, thLs is a good accord and satisfaction: Stagg v. Alexander
55 Barb.
AUCTION.

Forfeiture of Payment.-In sales by auction and other sales,
when it is stipulated that the percentage or part paid in the contract shall be forfeited if the purchaser does not comply with his
contract, such payment cannot be recovered at law or in equity:
Bullock v. Adam's Exr., 5 0. E. Green.
Puffers.-The employment of puffers by an owner of property
offered for sale at auction, orin the case of a judicial sale by creditors in whose behalf property is offered, for the purpose of increasing the price by fictitious bids, is a fraud upon honest bidders, and
a buyer at such a sale might be relieved from his purchase: N
Bank of Metropolis v. Sprague, 5 0. E. Green.
. It seems that the fact of a puffer having bid at the sale will not
avoid the sale, if after the bid of the puffer there is a bid by a real
purchaser, before the bid at which the property is knocked down:
1 From X. L. Freeman, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 48 and 49 Ills. Rep.
2 From C.E. Green, Esq.; to appear in vol. 5 of his Rep.
3 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in voL 65 of his Rep.
4 From S. P. Phillips, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 64 N. C. Rep.
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but that in all cases where the bid next preceding is that of a puffer, the sale is voidable by the purchaser.
Query.-Whether it would not be more just, in all cases where
sham bidders are employed to enhance the price, to hold that this
is a fraud upon purchasers, and that the sale is void? Id.
It is not unlawful for persons who wish to make ajoint purchase
of property about to be offered at auction to agree together that
they will authorize one person to bid for it upon their joint ac-

count: Id.
It is illegal for persons intending to purchase at auction to combine not to bid against each other; but the sale is confined to cases
where there is an agreement not to bid, and does not extend to
cases where several persons join to make a purchase for their common benefit, without an agreement not to compete, or to a case where
several creditors, no one of whom would be willing to purchase a
property of a very large value, unite to purchase: Id.
The fact that an agreement to make a joint purchase may indirectly operate to prevent the parties from competing, is not enough
to render the transaction unlawful; to have that effect it must
appear that making the object of the agreement was to avoid com.
petition: Id.
CONFEDERATE MwONEy.-See

Slave.

Contract-Inwhat Payable.-A bond was given for $1,000, dated
Nov. 18, 1862, and payable "one day after date," the consideration
being a tract of land: Held, to be competent for the plaintiff to
rebut the presumption as to the currency in which it was solvable
under the ordinance of 1866, by proving that it was expressly
agreed by the parties at the tine that it was to be paid." in good
money after the war," as such expression referred to the currency
in which, and not to the time at which, it was payable, and was
equivalent to, "in money good after the war." Sowers v. Earnhart, 64 N. C.
Presumptionof Currencyin which Noteis Payable.-The presumption, under the ordinance of 1865, that a note given for purchases
atan administrator's sale in March, 1864, payable attwelve months,
is solvable in money of the value of Confederate currency, is not
rebutted by evidence that at such sale the administrator gave notice
that he would receive in payment only such currency as would pay
the debts of his intestate, coupled with other evidence, that the
creditors would not receive Confederate currency, and that the
estate was largely insolvent. In such case the plaintiff is entitled
to recover the value of the articles sold: Laws v. Rycro/ft. 64 N. C.
N¢otice that Payment would not be Recieved in.-In an action upon
a bond in the usual form, given at an administrator's sale in Jan.,
1 165, proof that at the sale proclamation was made, that "Conf,terate notes will not be taken," rebuts the presumption made by
the ordinance of 1865 as to the currency in which notes, etc., are
solvable : and the fact that on the same occasion, before sale made,
the administrator, upon further inquiry by the bystanders, added
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"that if he had to collect the notes he would collect gold and silver, that if he could pay the notes over to the heirs, etc., they could
makeany arrangement they were willing to, as to payment," is
immaterial: Cherry v. Savage, 64 N. C.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Assets of Non-resident Decedent.-Upon the death of a nonresident, intestate, leaving assets in this State, they are to be applied to the payment of the claims of his resident creditors, if there
be any such, in the order prescribed by our law, and not by that
of his domicil: Carson v. Oates, 64 N. C.
Such assets are to be collected by an admihistratorappointed
here, and not by the creditors: ld.
CONTRACT.

Time of the Essence.-Courts of equity do not,-in general, consider the time of performance as of the essence of a contract for the
sale of lands, but hold that it may become of the essence by being
expressly made so by the contract itself; or by notice from the
other party insisting upon performance at a time fixed; or by the
subject matter of the contract and its surrounding circumstances:
Bullock v. Adams' Executors, 5 C. E. Green.
The rule which- allows time to be disregarded often causes injustice, and ought not to be extended: Id.
INSURANCE

Right to Terminate Risks.-Under a condition in a policy of in.
surance, reserving to the insurers the right to terminate the insurance at any time, on giving notice to that effect and refunding a
ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term, the return of the premium is the essential part to the condition to be performed, and a pre-requisite to this right to terminate the risk: Hathorn v. Germania Ins. Go., 55 Barb.
Notice, without a return of, or offer to return, the premium
amounts to nothing. Whatever negotiations may take place, until a return or tender of the premium is made, the policy still remains in force: Id.
A promise by the insured, to bring the policy to the office of the
agent to be canceled, when he is to receive the return premium,
neither amounts to a valid agreement that the policy shall be held
and deened canceled, without a return of the premium, nor to a
waiver of the performance of the condition on which the right to
:erminate the risk depends: Id.
JUDGMENT.

Loss of Record.-In an action upon a former judgment, the record of the judgment is the proper evidence thereof; and its production cannot be dispensed with, or supplied by any other evidence: Walton, Ex'r v.McKesson, 64 N. C.
Where the record of a judgment has been destroyed, the first step
25
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toward obtaining a remedy, is by proceeding in the court where
it was given, to the end that the record may be supplied: Id.
MECHANIC'S LIEN. *

What Essentialthereto- What Constitutes a Dischargeof.-In a
petition to enforce a mechanic's lien for lumber purchases to improve a certain lot, it is essential to the creation of the lien that
it shall appear to have been purchased for that purpose: Croskey
v. Morey, 48 Ills.
Where one of the members of a firm owns a lot, and he purchases lumber to improve the same, and the firm note is given in
payment-that would be such additional security as would discharge the lien: Id.
But if the firm orders the lumber to be placed on the premises,
and it is used in the improvement of the same, and the firm afterward gave their note for the amount, it would not operate to discharge the lien: Id.
In Proceedingsto enforce the Evidence must be Preserved in
the Record-The Ride of Adjustment.-This court has repeatedly
said, that in suits to enforce a mechanic's lien, the evidence must
be preserved in the record, otherwise, this court will presume that
the court below decreed properly as to the amount and the relative priority of the different liens: Croskey v. Northwestern Manufacturing Co., 48 Ills.
The rule for adjusting the different rights of parties holding
separate liens upon property, which is sought to be subjected to
the payment of a mechanic's lien, is, that an incumbrance anterior
to the mechanic's lien takes priority over it, to the extent of the
value of the property at the time the mechanic's lien attached, and
the mechanic's lien takes priority over the mortgage Only to the
extent of the additional value given to the property by the improvements : Id.
And in such suits the decree may direct a sale of the premises
in fee, notwithstanding the mortgage may not then be due, and if
such mortgage has the prior lien, it retains its priority to the extent of the value of the property at the'time the mechanic's lien
attached, this security being given by statute: Id.
The term "land," used in the 20th section of the act in relation
to mechanic's liens, means, the land, with such improvements as
there are upon it, at the time of the execution of the mortgage: Id.
And in such cases, it is not error for the court to decree a sale
of the property, and then direct the master to take evidence and
report to the court the comparative value of the land and improvements at the time of the sale, such value being determined in reference to the day of sale. Evidence after the sale would be more
satisfactory: Id.
MORTGAGE.-See Usury.
NEGLIGENCE.

Liabilhty of Railroad Companyfor Injuriesto Passengera.-In
an action against a railroad company, for injuries received by the
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plaintiff, from the upsetting of one of the defendant's cars, when
traveling upon its road, where the proof showed that the track
where the accident occurred was in a wretched condition, the rails
being badly worn and insecurely fastened, of various lengths, loose
at the ends, and with spaces between the joints, which were filled
with wooden plugs, and that some of the ties were broken in the
middle: held, that this was such gross and wanton negligence on
the part of the company as to reader it liable for the injury resulting therefrom: T. W. and W. Railway Co. v. Apperson, 49 Ills.
Railroad companies are bound to keep themselves informed as
to the condition of their tracks, and to know whether they are in
fit condition for the safe passage of their trains or not: Id.
NEw TRIAL.

Billfor-Wiihen Granted.-A court of equity will not award a
new trial at law, where the defense is a legal one and the party
could have made it in a suit against him, unless he was prevented
after means he could reasonably employ had failed, when he had
been diligent and not guilty of laches: Walker v. Kretsinger, 48 Ills.
Where two partners were sued and one of them spoke to attorneys to defend the suit, but gave them no facts nor the names of
witnesses by whom to establish a defense, they were not in a position to defend the suit, and when thatpartner died, and the other
partner gave the matter no attention, and judgment was rendered
against him by default: held, that there was such a want of diligence and such laches as would prevent a court of equity from decreeing a new trial in such a case: Id.
NUISANCE.

What constitutes--Slaughter House--Any trade or business,
however lawful in itself, which, from the place or manner in which
it is carried on, materially injures the property of others, or affects
their health, or renders the enjoyment of life physically uncomfortable, is a nuisance which it is the duty of this court to restrain:
Attorney General v. Steward, 5 0. E. Green.
A preliminary injunction will not be granted in behalf of the
owners of building lots held for sale, to restrain the erection near
them of a slaughter house, where it is not alleged that any one
intends to erect any buildings upon them. Whether the erection
of a slaughter house or other nuisance so near such lots as to re
tard or injure their saleis an injury for which the law will give dedress before buildings are erected, is a question proper to be retermined at law, and this court will not interfere by preliminary
injuction until the question is so determined: 1d.
An injunction will not be granted to restrain the erection of a
slaughter house and place for keeping hogs, where by the answer
and affidavits it appears the defendants intend to carry on the
business so as not to be a nuisance.
If it should be carried on in such manner as that it becomes a
nuisance, it then can be enjoined: Id.
No one has the right to pollute or corrupt the waters of a creek,
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or if they are already partially polluted to render them more so:
all whose lands border on a stream have the right to have its wa.
ters come to them pure and unpolluted: Id.
If the intended use of a slaughter house about to be erected will
by the discharge of the blood of the slaughtered animals corrupt
and pollute the stream for most of the purposes for which it may
be used by the owners of lands which border on it below, and so
affect it as to make its waters offensive to houses in the neighborhood, an injunction will be granted to prohibit the blood from being discharged into the stream: Id.
Smoke, Noise, etc..-Any business, however lawful in itself, which
as to those residing in the neighborhood, where it is carried on,
causes annoyances that materially interfere with the ordinary physical comfort of human existence, is a nuisance that should be restrained: Cleveland v. Citizen's Gas Light Co., 5. C. E. Green.
Smoke, noise and bad odors, even when not injurious to health,
cause a discomfort against which the law will protect: Id.
To warrant enjoining a trade as a nuisance on the ground that
it produces discomfort to those dwelling in the neighborhood, the
discomfort must be physical, and not such as depends upontaste or
imagination. Whatever is offensive physically to the senses, and
by such offensiveness makes life uncomfortable, is a nuisance: rd.
It is usual and proper where a building or works are being erected
that can only be used for a purpose that is unlawful, to restrain
erection; but when it is not made to appear that the business for
which the building is intended cannot possibly be carried on withbut becoming a nuisance, this court will deny the injunction and
leave the defendant at liberty to proceed with the erection of the
building at the risk of being restrained in the use of it, if a nuisance is ultimately created: Id.
The danger of explosion is not adequate cause for enjoining the
erection of a gas manufactory where it is not made to appear that
the danger is very great, or that the complainant's buildings are
sufficiently near to be seriously endangered by one should it take
place: Id.
The fact that a neighborhood to be affected by the odors and
offensive smell that will be caused by a business which the defendant is about to establish, and which complainant seeks to enjoin
as a nuisance, already contains establishments devoted to noxious
or disagreeable trades, is not enough to defeat the righL to an injunction, unless such neighborhood has been by their continuance
for years so wholly given up to such establishments, that the addition of the one contemplated by the defendant will not add sensibly to the discomfort: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Dissolution-Receiver.-In suits betweenpartners to dissolve a
partnership, when the tacts established are such as would upon the
final hearing entitle the complainant to a decree of dissolution, a
receiver will in general be appointed, and the defendant enjoined

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS..

from disposing of or meddling with the partnership property. The
injunction follows the appointment of a receiver almost as a matter
of course: Seighortner v Weissenborn, 5 0. E. Green.
Courts of equity will for sufficient cause dissolve a partnership
before the expiration of the term for which it was entered into.
And it is a sufficient cause for dissolution that it clearly appears
that the business for which the partnership was formed is impracticable, or cannot be carried on except at a loss. The object of al
commercial partnership is profit, and when that cannot be obtained,
the object fails, and the partnership should be te minated: Id.
The partnership will also be dissolved where all confidence
between the partners has been destroyed, so that they cannot proceed together in prosecuting the business for which it is formedJ
and this result follows not only when such want of confidence is
occasioned by misconduct or gross mismanagement of the partner against whom the dissolution is sought, but when such want of
confidence and distruct has arisen from other circumstances; provided it has become such as cannot probably be overcome, and was
not occasioned by the willful misconduct of the complainant: Id.
Where one partner has advanced to the firm, by way of loan,
moneys beyond the capital which he agreed to contribute, he is a
creditor of the firm to the amount so advanced; and as he has no
remedy at law, he is entitled to come into equity for relief, and to
have his loan repaid; and if the firm is insolvent or in failing circumstances, to have a receiver appointed: Id.
Gontributionsof Stock to the Firm-Representationsas to ValueLien of Partnerfor Advances.-The mere fact that the vendor of
personal property places an over valuation upon it, by which the
buyer is led to give more than it proves to be worth, does not entitle
the latter to relief. The vendor's statements as to value merely do
not amount to a warranty or to fraud ; although he knows them to
be untrue. The same rule applies to an over valuation of property
contributed to a partnership as part of the capital by one becoming
a partner: Uhler v. Semple, 5 (. E. Creen.
Where a new partnership is in course of negotiation between an
existing firm and a stranger, and the firm propose to put in the old
stock at a certain price, the maxim, "caveat emptor" applies: Id.
One partner cannot have relief against inequality in the terms
upon which he entered the firm upon the ground that he was
induced to accept the terms in question by statements of his copartners of an opinion that the capital or facilities possessed by the
proposed firm would be su:flcient, and that the business would be
pr,,fitable. Such representations, though false, give no ground of
action: Id.
One partner has a lien upon the partnership effects for moneys
advanced by him to the partnership beyond his share of the capital,
and can retain the amount due him before the other partners or
their individual creditors or assignees are entitled to receive any
of the assets: Id.
. He has, however, no such lien for money advanced or lent to ni
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individual partner; though a mortgage or judgment against nuch
partner, if property entered or recorded, will be a prior lien on his
share: Id.
It seems that an agreement by the borrowing partner that the
loan or debt should be a lien upon his share, and that he would
execute a mortgage, would be considered as an equitable mortgage,
and would give a preference over subsequent judgments and mortgages in favor of creditors with notice; though not over those
creditors without notice. Query--Whether a promise to give a
judgment bond which may be made a lien on real property will
amount to an equitable mortgage: rd.
Participationin Profits.-A simple agreementby a firm to employ
%ne at wages to be measured by a proportion of the profits does
not constitute him a partner: McMahon v. O'Donnell, 5 C. E.
Green.
SLAVE.

Bond for Price of-A bond given for the price of a slave sold in
1859 is valid, notwithstanding the public events which have happened since; nor is it affected by the fact that the slave was warranted such for life: West v. Hall, 64 N. C.
Bond for hire of.-A bond for money for the hire of a slave for
1865, given Jan. 2, 1865, is subject to be scaled according to the
value of the hire for a year, in lawful money, and not according to
the legislative table of the values of Confederate currency (Acts
of 1865-166, c. 39): Maxwell v. Hipp, 64 N. C.
STREAMi.-See Nuisance.
TIME.-See Contract.

Computationof-When any matter of proceeding or practice is
required by statute or rule of court to be within a certain number
of days, the first day, or terminus a quo is excluded; Thorne v.
Mosher, 5 C. E. Green.
The doctrine to be deduced from conflicting cases, in cases of
forfeiture is, that the day of the event after which in a specified
number of days the forfeiture occurs will be excluded. In applying this doctrine to quasi forfeiture (as when a mortgagor fails to
pay interest on a day specified), a court of equity should lean
against the construction which favors forfeiture: rd.
TPtSPASS.-See Vendor and Vendee.
Usuny.
Debt Cotracted n another State.-A debt in goodfaith contracted
in another State cannot be impeached for usury in this State, when
it does not appear by any evidence that the interest taken was
illegal in that State, or if it is, that the validity of the contract is
affected by it: Uhler v. Semple, 5 C. E. Green.
The laws of other States cau only be brought to the knowledge
of this court by proof: Id.
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Sale of Land with Agreement to .e-purchase.-One
may convey
lands for a certain price, and agree to re-purchase them at a fixed
time. for a certain amount exceeding the price received and interest, without the sale being construed a mortgage, or the transaction being affected with usury: Gleason v. Burk, 5 0. E. Green.
But such transactions are suspicious, and will not be sustained
unless there is clear proof of good faith, and that there was no intention to cover usury or to take away the right of redemption,
upon what was in truth a mortgage to secure a loan: Id.
An agreement by a borrower upon mortgage to allow the lender
to retain part of the land mortgaged after being repaid principal
and interest of the loan, if it is a part of the mortgage transaction,
is usurious, and will not be enforced either at law or in equity : IT.
But if such an arrangement is independent of the loan and mortgage, and not made in consideration of the loan, or the condition
of its being made, and capable of being sustained without reference
to them, either as a sale on consideration or as a gift, it may be
enforced; and though the agreement was not in writing effect will
be given to it, by limiting the quantity of land to be reconveyed,
on ordering redemption: Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.-See Partnership- Usury.
Sales of Personal Property-Bightof Purchasers.-Inan action of trespass to personal property, the court instructed for the
defendant, to the effect that unless the purchaser of a field of corn
gathers it within a reasonable time after it matures, the owner of
the field may turn in his cattle, without responding to his vendee
for the damage suffered by the destruction of the ungathered crop:
Held, that this was erroneous: Ogden v. Lucas, 48 Ills.
In such case the purchaser is not only entitled to a reasonable
time after the crop matures, to gather it, but to a reasonable time
after notice given by the- vendor: Id.
It is-equally erroneous in such case for the court to instruct the
jury that they could not find for the plaintiff, unless they could determine from the evidence, with mathematical precision, the exact
amount of damage done. Entire accuracy, in such cases, is impossible, and it is for the jury, upon the evidence adduced, to consider
and arrive at as near an estimate of the damages sustained as the
nature of the case will allow: Id
Recission of Sale by Vendee for Defect of Quality.-A party
who purchases and pays for a number of barrels of flour, warranted
as "extra and superfine," having upon their receipt notified the
vendor that a portion of them were of an inferior quality: Held,
that as the vendor did not come forward and remove them and
pay back the purchase-money, the purchaser had a right to sell
them within a reasonable time, and recover from the vendor any
loss upon re-sale, together with all proper expenses, such as would
reimburse him for his money expended, but not for any loss of a
good bargain: Ciford v. Betts, 64 N. 0.

